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Outline of Testimony of William T. Allen 




A. Chair of Independence Standards Board which was formed through the cooperative 
action of the SEC and the AICPA in 1997 and was authorized in February 1998 by SEC FRR 50 
to establish standards that have prima facie validity.  Other members of Board here with me - 
John Bogle, Robert Denham and Manuel Johnson.  Each will briefly speak. 
 
B. My background is as a judge (Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery 1985-97), 
Professor of Law and of Business (New York University 1997 - date) and as counsel or 
consultant to a law firm in New York (Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz).  I was asked by the 
Chairman to serve in this capacity and agreed to do so because I believed that there was 
opportunity for public service in doing so.   
 
C. Today I speak for myself and not the ISB institutionally…….. Nor do I speak for any 




2. Importance of Auditor Independence 
 
 Auditor independence in fact and in appearance is a vital protection to capital market 
efficiency and thus to economic welfare in our capital market-centered brand of capitalism.  On 
this I think there is universal agreement. 
 
 Evolution of the auditing profession into multi-service professional firms plainly gives 
rise to reasonable concerns that the integrity of financial data is being or may be adversely 
affected (or at the least markets may become suspicious of that fact and impose an additional 
discount for such risk). 
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 The ISB has commissioned studies on the perceptions of the investing public respecting 
the quality of financial reporting and the issue of auditor independence.  The most recent report 
of findings was delivered to the Board last week by the research firm Earnscliffe Research & 
Communications.  Stated very broadly the results of that study were rather similar to an earlier 
study.  Both concluded that there was a high degree of trust in the integrity of financial 
statements and in the auditing process, but nevertheless that the importance of non-audit services 
to modern audit firms represented a source of concern.  The report has been furnished to the SEC 




3. Independence Standards Board 
 
Until this rule making, the method adopted by the SEC to try to bring its evolved rulings 
on auditor independence into a form consistent with the modern economy was the formation in 
1997 of the ISB and the delegation to the ISB of responsibility to create principle-based 
standards for the determination of auditor independence.  In February 1998 the SEC issued FRR 
50 that officially designated the ISB as having authority to issue standards that would have prima 
facie authority, unless and until rejected by the SEC.  The Board has proceeded on this task 
diligently since that time.  One of the issues that this rulemaking raises for the Board, which is 
perhaps of secondary importance to the public interest, is what effect is the proposed rule-
making intended to have – or will have without regard to intent --  on the role and mission of the  
ISB going forward.   I pass over that point for the moment.  
 
The ISB is making good progress.  It recently adopted its 3rd Standard – dealing with 
employment by audit clients of former auditor employees.  And it is ready to release its Exposure 
Drafts dealing with Financial Interests in Audit Clients and Family Relationships and with 
Appraisals and Valuations.  Both of these projects were suspended with the issuance of this 
proposed rule making that addresses these questions itself.  
 
Generally the Board has suspended its projects at the moment except for its project on a 
general Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence.  That project was undertaken early on 
in the Board’s operation. We see this task as important to achievement of a long-term goal of a 
coherent and effective system of standards.  We retained two academics to act as our reporters 
and impaneled a Task Force of experts from within and without the accounting profession.  That 
Task Force under Board oversight has almost completed its project after about two years of 
steady work.  This has been a very large and time consuming effort, and we are now within 
several months of a final statement. At the conclusion of my brief remarks I want to mention my 
concern that this rule making will render that work and the benefits that might come from a 
thoughtful conceptual framework illusory.   
 
 Specific ISB projects .  
    
A. ISB Standard No. 1:  Designed to encourage greater auditor – audit 
committee interaction with respect to independence.  
 
 3
B. ISB Standard No. 2:  Designed to address a specific appearance problem 
related to audits of mutual funds and affiliated entities. 
 
C. ISB Standard No. 3:  Designed to modernize independence rules 
respecting employment of former audit firm partners or employees by 
audit clients.  
 
D. Project on Financial Interests of Audit Firm Personnel in Audit Clients:  
At Exposure Draft stage - thus currently close to completion, but recently 
deferred due to overlap with this proposed rule making.  
 
E. Project on Family Relations:  At Exposure Draft stage - thus currently 
close to completion but recently deferred due to overlap with this 
proposed rule making. 
 
F. Project on Valuation and Appraisal Services:  At Exposure Draft stage – 
also deferred due to overlap with this proposed rule making.  The ISB has 
tentatively concluded that independence standards should preclude auditor 
provision of these services where the asset valued (or all such assets 
valued) have financial statement significance. 
 
G. Project on Future Firm Structures:  This project, unlike the foregoing ones, 
represents an aspect of the larger question:  what forms should firms that 
provide audit services to public companies be legally permitted to take.  






4. Summary of Testimony 
 
A. I warmly support that aspect of the Proposed Rule making that would mandate public 
disclosure of facts respecting non-audit services provided to audit clients.  Since this 
change in policy requires amended issuer disclosure it is beyond the authority of the ISB 
to implement through standard setting.  It is nevertheless the most significant single 
change that can be made in my opinion respecting auditor independence.  The wisdom of 
the original decision to premise our capital markets regulation on disclosure and not 
government substantive economic judgments has been reaffirmed over the decades.  
There is no reason that information about non-audit services -- if in fact it is information 
that relates to the integrity of financial disclosure and thus to financial risk -- will not be 
priced. 
 
An additional strong reason to support this change in disclosure policy is that the ability 
of markets to price the risk associated with this information will permit financial 
economists to conduct studies of the existence of any risk premium associated with this 
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information.  Such information would be extremely helpful; if an informed market does 
not care about this information, the case for regulating these relationships is reduced.  On 
the other hand if the market does care (i.e., firms that have auditors who perform 
substantial non-audit services are penalized by a higher average cost of capital) then the 
activity will to some extent be self-correcting.  
 
Thus, especially in the absence of good social scientific data respecting the costs and 
benefits of the provision of non-audit services, it is arguable (and I believe) that 
disclosure is the optimal social policy.   
 
B. Nevertheless, I do not oppose the substantive provisions in the proposed rule dealing 
with scope of permissible services to audit clients.  If forced to make a judgment on 
current information, I would be inclined to join in this judgment.  But, as I am not 
required by events to make such a judgment now, the lack of good information regarding 
a correlation between an increase in the provision of non-audit services to audit clients 
and a decrease in reliability of financial statements precludes me at this time from 
endorsing this expanded prohibition.   Others with more intimate knowledge of the 
practices followed in the world of auditing would have more dependable intuitions on 
this subject.  In all events in this setting of highly imperfect information, the choice here 
represents a public policy estimate of where the balance of public interest lies.  I know of 
no facts that make the proposals made unreasonable exercises of policy-making 
judgment. 
 
C. With respect to other aspects of the proposed rule, I do respectfully recommend that the 
proposal’s provisions relating to Employment with Audit Clients be modified to conform 
to Independence Standard Board Standard No. 3. 
 
That standard reflects the best judgment of a board comprising experienced individuals 
and a process that entailed wide public participation.  This Commission authorized the 
ISB to undertake that work and I respectfully suggest that where the product of that 
process represents a reasonable and good faith balancing of appropriate factors in 
standard setting, the Commission should limit its options to accepting or rejecting an ISB 
Standard in toto. 
 
Of course the SEC can and should reject a standard that in its judgment is not consistent 
with the public interest.  But I suggest that it ought not to “second guess” specific 
judgments that are built into an ISB Standard.  The SEC should accept or reject a 
standard.  It is not reasonable to expect that senior professional people will continue to 
dedicate their time to this form of public service if the end result of the lengthy public 
deliberation process is in effect a proposal to the SEC Staff for modification.  Attached is 
a brief summary of differences between ISB No. 3 and the Proposed Rule’s treatment of 
the employment with audit clients. 
 
D. I also respectfully recommend that the SEC amend those aspects of the proposed rule 
dealing with Family Relations and Financial Interests to conform to the existing ISB 
Exposure Draft of Standards which reflect the best judgment of the Board on those topics 
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as of this time, or alternatively defer acting on those aspects of the rule until the ISB has 
completed its Standard setting process on these subjects and then adopt or reject those 
standards.  Attached hereto is an appendix that briefly identifies the differences from the 
proposed ISB ED on these subjects and that of the proposed Rule. 
 
E.  Finally I must express concern that the adoption of this rule -- with its highly abbreviated 
and abstract conceptual underpinnings -- will unduly restrict the development of the 
ISB’s Conceptual Framework Project.  That project has been in the works for almost two 
years and is close to fruition.  It has involved a large Task Force of volunteer experts 
from the accounting and investment communities as well as academics and others.  The 
existing product of the Conceptual Framework Task Force is sophisticated and deeply 
considered.  We are now in the process of considering public comments on that 
document.  It would not be good policy in my opinion to shortcut that process or to 
constrain its conclusions by the adoption of a brief statement of core threats to 
independence that is contained in the Proposed Rule. 
 
The framework of the proposed rule is a first step at a conceptual framework, but it is just 
a first step.  I agree that values or principles that form the premise for the proposed rule 
constitute significant threats to auditor independence.  Advocacy, mutuality or conflict of 
interest, auditing one’s own work and performing management functions for an audit 
client certainly are problematic for auditor independence.  But these generalities need 
much more conceptual refinement before they can be useful guides to standard-setting 
independence determinations.  What constitutes advocacy for example will often not be 
clear.  Mutuality of interest too should be deemed a problem, but always?  To the extent 
of every mutual interest?  What about a passive investment in which an audit client also 
has a passive investment?  Say limited partnership interests.  This is a mutual interest, 
does it in all events prevent the auditor from being independent?  What if these 
investments are material to both?  Or financially material to neither?  What are the factors 
that count in deciding when it might and when it doesn’t ?  The framework won’t help 
people know.  
 
 Thus I tend not to share the optimistic view of the proposal, that its adoption would 
helpfully clarify the work of the ISB or at least to do so in a way that is consistent with 
careful, highly textured standard setting.  The ISB framework as it is evolving is 
premised on a principle of defining threats to independence and identifying whether 
safeguards that comply with stated requirements will be deemed satisfactory to protect 
against such threats.  While in some details – largely adopted from ISB work product – 
the proposal seems to embrace safeguards, more fundamentally it seems to be a document 
that is simply prohibitive.  
 
 Thus while certain aspects of the proposal – specifically mandated disclosure -- I do 
warmly embrace and others – specifically scope of services -- I am agnostic about, I do 
express a concern that the rule making will effect in ways I do not fully appreciate the 
ISB process which I thought was a well structured way to approach the general topic of 





Independence Standards Board 
 
Employment with Audit Clients 
 
Comparison of the Provisions of ISB No. 3, Employment with Audit Clients,  
and the Recent SEC Rulemaking Proposal 
 
 
ISB No. 3, Employment with Audit Clients (the ISB standard), addresses the auditor 
independence concerns raised when audit firm professionals join firm audit clients.  Briefly, 
these concerns are that: 
 
 the auditor may have been eager to please the client in an attempt to elicit a job offer; 
 
 the former firm professional may be able to circumvent the audit because of his or her 
knowledge of the audit’s scope, design, or testing strategy; 
 
 the remaining audit team may not exhibit the requisite skepticism when evaluating the 
work or representations of a former firm colleague; 
 
 if capital and retirement balances owed to the former firm professional are material to the 
firm, the former firm professional may be able to use these outstanding obligations to 
influence the firm in the conduct of the audit; 
 
 if unsettled capital and retirement obligations are immaterial to the firm, there may still 
be an appearance of inappropriate ties between the audit firm and its client.  
 
The provisions of the SEC’s rulemaking proposal (the SEC’s proposal) dealing with the 
employment with audit client issues differ from the ISB’s standard in several important aspects: 
 
 The SEC’s proposal does not require the safeguards mandated by the ISB’s standard to 
address the risk of audit circumvention, or a lack of skepticism on the part of the 
remaining audit team members.  These safeguards include: 
 consideration of the need to modify the audit plan,  
 review of engagement team members to ensure that they have the appropriate 
stature and relationship with the former firm professional to effectively evaluate 
his or her work and statements, and 
 review of the subsequent audit to ensure that the engagement team exhibited the 
requisite objectivity. 
 
 Both proposals would require settlement of capital accounts of former partners joining 
audit clients.  The SEC proposal, however, would only require settlement if the former 
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partner “is in an accounting or financial reporting oversight role,” whereas the ISB 
standard would require settlement regardless of the position assumed at the client. 
 
 Similarly, both proposals would require settlement of retirement arrangements of former 
firm professionals employed at an audit client.  The SEC proposal, however, would 
require settlement of all arrangements unless fixed and fully funded, whereas in general, 
the ISB standard would only require settlement if the amounts were material to the firm.  
In developing its standard, the Board concluded because a former firm professional 
employed at a firm audit client could not use an immaterial obligation of the firm to 
influence the outcome of the audit, requiring settlement could pose an unnecessary and 
potentially severe burden on the former firm professional or on the firm.  For example, 
under U.S. tax rules, a retirement benefit owed by a qualified plan could not be “settled” 
– i.e., paid out – unless that alternative were offered to all former employees 
participating in the plan.  Providing this option for all plan participants could increase the 
costs of providing benefits, and result in a decrease in the level of benefits offered.  In 
other instances, a requirement to settle even immaterial retirement balances might cause 
a professional to be unable to accept a job offer, or force the client to hire another audit 
firm.  The Board believed that imposing such costs without offsetting benefits to auditor 







Independence Standards Board 
 
Financial Interests of the Auditor in, and Family Relationships between,  
the Auditor and the Audit Client 
 
Comparison of the ISB’s Proposed Standard and  




The SEC proposals on financial interests and family relationships have the same general thrust as 
those in the ISB draft ED, including a major change in defining the individuals who need to be 
independent, intended to modernize the current rules.  Specifically, both the SEC and ISB 
proposals dramatically reduce the number of individuals restricted under the “member” approach 




The SEC and ISB proposals would prohibit both those on the audit engagement and those in a 
position to influence the audit from owning any direct financial interest in the audit client.  The 
SEC proposal, however, would include in that group all professionals providing non-audit 
services to an audit client from owning an investment in the client. In contrast, the ISB proposal 
would limit those professionals to partners and managers, on the basis that non-audit staff below 
those categories do not have influence on the audit and therefore need not be restricted. 
 
On the other hand, the ISB proposal would prohibit a person on the audit from having an other 
close relative (parent, non-dependent child or sibling) from having an investment in the audit 
client that is material to both the auditor and the close relative, if the auditor knows about it.  The 
SEC proposal does not cover this situation.  The ISB believes that knowledge of such a material 
investment could impact the auditor’s objectivity, and therefore prohibits it. 
 
Investments in clients often are related to employment, and because employment of spouses has 
become much more frequent,  impediments to such employment must be justified. In that spirit, 
the ISB concluded that although other partners in an office participating in the audit should not 
own client securities, that prohibition need not extend to employer-sponsored benefit plan 
investments of their immediate family members, given that their employment role also must be 
evaluated as acceptable. In this case, the threat from such stock ownership was considered 
minimal, but the inability to participate in the benefit plan would make such employment much 






Family Relationships - Employment 
 
The SEC proposal would prohibit employment of immediate family members and close relatives 
in an accounting or financial reporting oversight role, and these restrictions would apply to all 
categories of “covered persons.” 
 
The ISB proposal applies restrictions based on whether the firm professional is on the audit or in 
a position to influence the audit, and whether the family member is an immediate versus an other 
close family member.  For example, The ISB proposal would prohibit someone on the audit 
engagement from having an immediate family member employed in any position at the audit 
client.  People frequently develop financial or emotional ties to their employer, and the desire to 
protect an immediate family member’s employer (and his or her job) may affect the auditor’s 
objectivity, whatever the relative’s position at the client.  
 
In addition the ISB proposal would prohibit both immediate family members and close relatives 
from being employed in a key policy-making position at the client, and would also restrict 
immediate family members from holding a sensitive financial position at the client.  Restrictions 
are targeted to the risks to protect the auditor’s independence, recognizing that overly restrictive 
rules impose costs that may exceed their benefits. 
 
Finally, for other partners in a work office, where the ISB views the threats as generally being 
less strong, only specified senior positions are prohibited for immediate family members, and 
none are for other relatives.  The SEC proposal, however, would continue to bar all the oversight 






To:  ISB Members 
From:  Hank Jaenicke and Alan Glazer 
CC:  Art Siegel 
Date:  7/21/00 
Re: Comparison of ISB’s Conceptual Framework with SEC 
Proposed Rule 
 
Here is the comparison Chairman Allen requested of the approach 
we have been using in the ISB’s conceptual framework project and 
the approach taken in the SEC’s proposal on auditor 
independence.  We believe those approaches are fundamentally 
different: the ISB project contemplates a threats and safeguards 
approach to assessing independence risk.  The SEC’s proposal is 
a compliance-based approach to a bright-line general standard 
and governing principles. 
 
The purpose of the ISB’s project is “to develop a conceptual 
framework for independence applicable to audits of public 
entities which will serve as the foundation for the development 
of principles-based independence standards” [ISB, “Objective and 
Mission”].  The staff has interpreted that purpose broadly, and 
the conceptual framework being developed is intended to be 
useful not just to the ISB but also to other parties, such as 
auditors, accounting firms and audit committees, who make 
decisions about auditor independence in situations where no 
specific rules or standards apply.  Unless the Board decides to 
change the approach described in the Discussion Memorandum, the 
ISB’s conceptual framework will include a definition and a goal 
of auditor independence.  In addition, concepts and basic 
principles will be provided that describe the process by which 
independence decision-makers can assess whether auditor 
independence is impaired.   
 
The process contained in the framework can be applied to a wide 
range of threats to auditor independence, including those that 
exist in today’s audit environment and new types of threats that 
might emerge in the future.  The ISB’s conceptual framework will 
not contain standards or prescribe safeguards that eliminate or 
mitigate those threats.  The framework is intended to provide 
direction and structure for resolving independence issues and to 
 11
help focus debate and serve as boundaries for discussions on 
those issues. 
 
The purposes of the SEC’s proposal are different.  The SEC 
describes them as follows: 
 
[to] consolidate and make more accessible 
the standards for auditor independence under 
the federal securities laws, reemphasize its 
importance, and provide a comprehensive 
framework for evaluating auditor 
independence [Proposed Rule, “Revision of 
the Commission’s Auditor Independence 
Requirements, Section II.D]. 
 
We do not believe that the SEC proposal is intended to provide a 
conceptual framework for auditor independence, with fully 
articulated and logically connected components.  For example, it 
does not explicitly define auditor independence or state its 
goal.  Instead, it contains a “general standard” or “basic test 
for an auditor’s independence”—an operational benchmark against 
which the SEC can measure registrants’ and their auditors’ 
compliance with statutory requirements for independence under 
the federal securities acts.  This general standard is as 
follows: 
 
The Commission will not recognize an accountant as 
independent, with respect to an audit client, if the 
accountant is not, or would not be perceived by 
reasonable investors to be, capable of exercising 
objective and impartial judgment on all issues 
encompassed within the accountant’s engagement [proposed 
section 210.2-01, paragraph (b)]. 
 
The SEC proposal also specifies four “governing principles” that  
 
Incorporate situations that we believe reasonable 
investors would agree impair an auditor’s independence.  
They are when the auditor: 
 
• has a mutual or conflicting interest with the audit 
client; 
• audits the accountant’s own work; 
• functions as management or an employee of the audit 
client; or 
• acts as an advocate for the audit client. 
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[Section III, “Discussion of Proposed Rules” 
(footnotes omitted)]. 
 
The final section of the SEC proposal applies the “governing 
principles” to a large number of specific situations that the 
SEC believes impair auditor independence.  Those situations 
exist when an auditor (a) has certain financial, employment, or 
business relationships with, (b) provides certain non-audit 
services to, or (c) receives contingent fees from the auditor’s 
audit clients and affiliates of those clients.  The proposed 
rule does not consider that, in particular circumstances, the 
risk of impaired independence might be adequately mitigated by 
controls other than proscriptions.  (The SEC rule does not use 
the term “safeguards,” which is used in the ISB project to 
describe both controls and proscriptions that mitigate or 
eliminate threats to auditor independence.)  Instead, the SEC 
proposal: provides “limited exceptions from the rules” if 
certain conditions are satisfied (e.g., auditing firms have 
certain quality controls in place); indicates that the rules do 
not apply to situations that meet specified criteria (e.g., 
credit card balances of less than $10,000 held by audit 
clients); and describes alternatives that the Commission is 
considering that would limit the applicability of some of the 
rules (e.g., if an auditing firm were adequately separated into 
audit and non-audit units, the independence rules would not to 
apply to services provided to audit clients by the non-audit 
unit). 
 
The ISB conceptual framework, as we see the project developing, 
would look on the SEC’s “governing principles” as threats to 
auditor independence.  (The Board’s conceptual framework would 
identify and discuss what we believe is a complete list of 
various categories of threats.)  It is likely that the ISB would 
consider the situations described in the SEC proposal as 
examples of circumstances that give rise to threats to auditor 
independence.  The ISB conceptual framework, however, would not 
contain an analysis of specific circumstances or indicate how 
the ISB should respond to them.  We believe that should be part 
of the ISB’s standard-setting process.  The Board’s conceptual 
framework would, however, describe the approach that the ISB 
would use to analyze specific circumstances and develop 
standards.  That approach would involve assessing the level of 
independence risk posed in specific circumstances by considering 
both threats to auditor independence and whether safeguards have 
eliminated or adequately mitigated those threats. 
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Partly because the approaches described above are so different, 
we believe that the components of the ISB’s framework are likely 
to differ from the framework contained in the SEC’s proposal.  
It is too early to identify differences in detail because they 
depend on specific decisions regarding its framework that the 
Board has not yet made.  We do believe, however, that the 
frameworks are fundamentally different, and that the resulting 
approach to setting independence standards would be quite 
different. 
 
